Are terrorists on another planet? by Richards, Barry




The latest audiotape from Osama bin Laden raises again the question of who al-Qaeda 
represents. Is the ‘offer’ of a ‘truce’ a message to take on board from someone who 
speaks for millions of  people? Or does it express yearnings of an iconic but deluded 
figure whose fantasy of speaking and negotiating with peoples and states should not 
be taken seriously at face value?  This question has its counterpart in our efforts to 
understand the relationships of the July bombers to their communities in Britain.  
 
Sir Ian Blair warned last December of an intensifying threat from terrorist cells based 
in the UK. Understanding the development of these cells is therefore a security 
priority, and this is seen by many as requiring us to look closely at the depth of anger 
felt by many young people in Muslim communities. But do our current forms of 
terrorist threat have an intrinsic and necessary relationship with the communities from 
which the terrorists come and whose ultimate interests they purport to advance? Or 
are the cells more akin to cults, marked by a fundamental ethical and emotional 
disengagement from all the people and realities of everyday life around them? 
 
In some cases, where terrorist organisations are strong, relatively stable and relatively 
large, they may play significant if ad hoc roles in welfare provision or policing in their 
communities, as with the IRA and Hamas. In those situations, it is clear that there is a 
lot of active support in the community, and wider passive support or acquiescence, 
and that this support helps to sustain the scale and success of the terrorist strategy. 
The Al Qaida network, with its mobile, completely clandestine and time-limited 
groupings, is obviously in a different type of relationship to its ‘host’ community. Yet 
fears that cells can and do grow only in the fertile soil of culturally segregated and 
disaffected communities are still widespread. In the UK at present, the alienation of 
large sections of the Muslim community, especially young people, from British 
society as a whole, is often seen as an important, perhaps crucial, factor in generating 
the risk of further terrorist attacks. The precise relationship between terrorist cell or 
individual and the wider Muslim community may not always be clearly specified, but 
there are general fears that parts of the community may tolerate, condone, collude 
with or otherwise increase the likelihood of the adoption by a very few individuals of 
active jihadist paths which lead to terror.  
 
It is certainly plausible on common-sense grounds that widespread and profound 
bitterness may enable those individuals to feel that what they do or plan to do is 
justified, and that they have some tacit licence to proceed – if a clearly ambivalent one 
- from their own communities. Hence the prominence in current counter-terrorist 
strategies of engaging with the Muslim communities, and seeing action in and through 
them as a key to preventing malignant radicalisation. Both the Home Office and the 
police are very active on this front, for example through the police National 
Community Tension Team. The set of seven working groups of leading Muslims set 
up by the Home Office after 7/7 recently reported to it on various ways to ‘prevent 
extremism together’, and some of their recommendations seem likely to gather 
support, as well as provoking intense debate (and arguments about the 
representativeness of the groups) in the coming months.  
 
There are also some more academic reasons, and some political ones, for seeing 
actions addressing Muslim populations as a whole, and actions within their 
communities, as fundamental to counter-terrorism. The study of group dynamics 
teaches us that marginal individuals are often expressing something for the whole 
group. And some psychological studies of terrorists appear to show that they are 
‘normal people’, indistinguishable from their peers. Moreover, the political arguments 
of many across the political spectrum assume that Muslims have objective reasons to 
be aggrieved, and that grievance feeds extremism, even while a majority may 
continue to disavow terrorist strategies. 
 
There is both a chill and a comfort to this approach. The chill comes from the 
disturbing thought that the 7/7 terrorists really were ‘home-grown’, or at least that the 
soil in which they grew as terrorists included spadefuls of today’s Britain, whether 
one emphasises therein the inequalities and racism of the dominant society, or the 
inwardness and bitterness of Muslim sub-societies. The comfort is in the idea that a 
solution to the problem is within our reach: if we currently provide the environment 
necessary to succour terrorism, then we can also strive to change that environment, 
and to remove or at least much reduce the chances of murderous militancy 
developing. 
 
The approach may however be mistaken, in at least some respects. The previous, 
small occurrence of ‘home-grown terrorism’ in Britain – the Angry Brigade of the 
early 1970s - required no collusive or ambivalent cover from any substantial section 
of society. This would scarcely have been forthcoming in a then still politically and 
culturally quite conservative nation. Instead it erupted from a certain kind of 
revolutionary polemic directly igniting destructiveness in a few intense and secretive 
individuals. The 7/7 bombers similarly appear to have lived part of their time in a 
parallel universe to their families and friends. It may be that the sufficient condition 
for terrorism is the combination of inspirational sources with a handful of disturbed 
individuals. This of course does not fit the ‘terrorists are regular guys’ theory, but that 
theory anyway lacks common-sense plausibility. Some non-ideological mass 
murderers lived very normal lives outside of their murdering activities, but we would 
not be led to conclude that they were psychologically average. 
 
So perhaps the problem is better stated in terms of a fundamental disconnection 
between terrorists and their societies, rather than in terms of a basic connection or 
even continuity between them and their communities. They are split off from their 
immediate material and emotional communities as well as from the more distant and 
imagined general ‘society’. Only by understanding them as being psychologically in a 
parallel universe, or - to use another telling everyday metaphor - on a different planet, 
can we make sense of their readiness indiscriminately to annihilate others around 
them in their own society. 
 
Yet terrorists (home-grown, emigre or peripatetic) are members of something, 
whether that is a para-military organisation, a defined movement or an elusive 
‘network’. This is one thing that differentiates them from non-ideological (though 
equally focussed and other-worldly) killers such as Shipman and Nilsen. A recent 
article by the German sociologist Karin Knorr Cetina1 has thrown valuable light on 
how the loose, shifting, complex structure of Al Qaeda has been able to generate such 
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tightly organised, committed and disproportionately effective action by small cells. 
These are held together, and linked with strong psychological bonds to the rest of the 
ill-defined network, by a transcendent sense of time and purpose. To survive in a cell, 
and to get its promised benefit of salvation (as in, for example, a sense of fullness for 
an empty self, or an experience of dramatic strength for the inwardly humiliated), you 
have to buy totally into the transcendence of quotidian society. Knorr Cetina writes of 
the ‘”futural” mode of living’, in which the future triumph of jihad (and possibly its 
entwinement with personal death) is the vertex of a transcendent temporality. The key 
to entering this mode is to be found in the media artefacts of texts, images, 
commentary and speeches which serve as a corpus of mobilising material, and which 
hold together the global affective community of terrorist jihadists. Elsewhere, 
especially in the Middle East, that community may be represented by people who are 
far more really embedded in their communities of origin. And of course at a global 
level, there are deep - if complex - links between Islamist terrorism and some 
components of geo-political reality, in the status of Muslims as oppressed people in a 
number of key conflicts. That does not however mean that our ‘home grown’ or 
imported terrorists are living in empathic contact with their own part of geo-political 
reality, namely Britain. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the root of contemporary UK terrorism in a global flow of 
transcendent meaning, there is still a crucial value in engagement with the 
communities in which terrorists live, even if they ‘live’ there in body alone. That 
value is of course to pragmatic counter-terrorism intelligence efforts, and lies in the 
information about oddities and goings-on which a close and reasonably trusting 
engagement may bring. But alongside this practical strategy, a deeper and clearer 
analysis of the relationship between (potential) terrorists and their communities is 
needed, since our understanding of this relationship will influence how counter-
terrorist objectives shape policing. This aspect of the relations between the state and 
citizens of Muslim background is likely to be one of the key issues in determining 
social cohesion in Britain in the coming years. It will certainly influence how many 
Muslims see the British state (their state). How we see the genesis of home-grown 
terrorism will also influence how non-Muslims see Muslims. Downplaying the ideas 
that there is collusion with or tolerance of terror amongst Muslim communities may 
be helpful (though whatever levels of support there may be here for suicide bombers 
in Palestine and Iraq limits the overall truthfulness of this strategy). It would not 
release Muslim leaders from the responsibility of making the most emphatic 
denunciations of terrorism, as long as attacks continue to be dressed in Islamist 
language, but it would enable all of us to focus more effectively on the twin drivers of 
attacks in niche jihadist global media outputs and in the formation of small groups 
based on visions of the cataclysmic road to the sublime. 
